By the year AD 2000 it seems probable that Islam will be one of the half-dozen significant political forces in the world. The others will be Lenino-marxism, Confucio-marxism, probably Catholic Christianity, probably an amalgam of humanism and Protestant Christianity, and Buddhism, perhaps in some sort of alliance with Hinduism. To many Europeans and Americans it may seem strange to include religions among political forces, because they have been accustomed to think of religion as concerned only with personal piety. They are misled, however, by the divorce of religion and politics in the West since the European wars of religion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Throughout the vast ranges of world history it has been normal for religion to be closely linked with politics. The reason is not far to seek. When politics becomes serious and it is a question of men being ready to die for the cause they support, there has to be some deep driving force in their lives. Usually this force can be supplied only by a religion, or by an ideology that is acquiring some of the functions of religion (such as making man aware of the powers on which his life is dependent). This question of the relation of religion and politics will concern us further in the course of the study.
My aim in what follows is to show the roots or genesis of the political conceptions operative in the Islamic world today. In this region of the world it is particularly necessary to look at the past, since for Muslims as for Irishmen history is still alive. The Islamic community is still divided by events that took place in 632 and 656. A remark about an incident concerning one of Muhammad's wives in the year 627, when made in the Sudan in 1965, led to riots and the declaration that the Communist party was illegal.
The World Islamic Front brought together Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda ("the groundwork") and four other organizations, including Islamic Jihad and the Egyptian Islamic Group. The formation of the front is a sign that at least the leaders of these groups see themselves as pursuing a common set of Islamic goals. It is difficult to say how many people these leaders represent, but they aim to address the conscience of "all Muslims."
The declaration is a formal statement of the duty of Muslims, written in the style of what I call "Shari'a reasoning." (To call it "Islamic jurisprudence" or "Islamic religious law" would be slightly misleading.) Shari'a reasoning presupposes that there is an ideal way for human beings to live. The very term "Shari'a" means "the Path." The declaration further presupposes that God provides "signs" for those who would discern the contours of this path. These signs are primarily texts: the Qur'an and the hadith, or "reports" relating the exemplary practice of Muhammad. Shari'a reasoning is, in effect, a kind of transgenerational conversation among Muslims regarding the implications of these signs and about the behaviors that are most consistent with the ideal way and which therefore will lead to happiness in this world and the next.
In Shari'a reasoning, these signs must be correlated with the facts of the contemporary situation. It is clear that the authors of the declaration consider the "occupation" of the Arabian peninsula by U.S. forces as the primary, though not the only, indication that the Muslim community faces an emergency. From other statements by bin Laden and his colleagues, we know he also has expressed concern about the situation in Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya and Kashmir. The World Islamic Front ties the post-gulf war presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia to the ongoing suffering of the Iraqis and the Palestinians. The declaration suggests that there is a vast conspiracy in which the U.S. and its allies seek by various means to negate the influence of Islam, undercut the Muslim community, and control the natural resources of Islamic countries.
It is this crisis that leads to the declaration's central judgment: that fighting against Americans and their allies--civilians and soldiers--is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do so in any country where that is possible. The phrasing of this judgment is most significant, in terms of Shari'a reasoning. Jihad, or "struggle," is a wide-ranging term in Islamic tradition. Always connected with the qualifying phrase "in the path of God," it is tied to the general duty of Muslims to "command the good and forbid the evil" in a variety of ways--by doing good works, promoting social justice, voting, teaching in schools and, under certain conditions, by qital ("fighting"). Even here, there are important nuances regarding the duty of Muslims. Under ordinary conditions, for example, when fighting is justified to secure the borders of an Islamic state, it is described as a "collective duty." This implies that an established ruler or governing authority will make a judgment concerning the necessity of fighting. Such a ruler is authorized to provide for the common defense by raising an army, levying taxes and generally rallying support from the citizenry. Every Muslim should support the effort, although not every Muslim has to fight.
Under emergency conditions, however, the duty to fight is described as an "individual duty." If, for example, an enemy has invaded Islamic territory, compromising the lives, liberty and property of Muslims, and the established authorities are unable or unwilling to mount an effective defense, the duty to fight devolves to every Muslim. Ordinary lines of command and control are suspended. An underage person may leave home to fight without parental approval; a woman may join the fight without the approval of her husband or father. In a 1996 letter, bin Laden spoke of a collective duty to strike against the U.S. presence in the Arabian peninsula. Muslims, bin Laden wrote, should put aside their differences and join in a communal resistance to oppression. But by 1998, the judgment was that the crisis had reached the level of an emergency.
In support of this judgment, a selection of the opinions of "ulama [learned authorities] throughout Islamic history" is cited. The authors of the declaration argue that the tradition of Shari'a reasoning, in connection with a faithful rendering of present-day political life, provides precedents relevant to emergency conditions. If one combines the claim that "nations are attacking Muslims like people fighting over a plate of food" with the citation of Qur'an 4:75--"And why should you not fight in the cause of God and of those who, being weak, suffer oppression?"--one has the heart of the declaration.
Three issues are of particular import in the document: the authority of the authors to render Shari'a judgments, the scope of legitimate fighting in Shari'a reasoning, and the question of legitimate targets.
The question is one of credentials. Historically, the textual nature of Shari'a reasoning gave rise to a class of scholars known as al-ulama, or "the learned." One becomes a member of this class by completing a long course of study in grammar, philology, history and logic, as well as in interpretation of the Qur'an and the hadith. Mastery of these fields qualifies one to issue opinions (fatwa) regarding the duty of Muslims in particular circumstances. Even so, these opinions usually echo the great masters of an established school of thought. Only a very few ever attain the status of a mujtahid, who is qualified to issue "independent" opinions.
The notion that Muslims have an obligation to fight Americans and their allies "in any country where that is possible" immediately commands attention. The declaration's use of crisis language echoes that of other Islamic resistance groups. Still, most of these groups speak only of armed resistance in the service of defending or liberating their homeland. The charter of the Hamas group, for instance, focuses on the duty of each Muslim to participate in fighting to liberate Jerusalem from Israeli control. It does not call on Muslims to carry the fighting abroad. The reasoning of the declaration seems clear: the crisis facing Muslims has its roots not only in the corruption or inadequacy of the governments of Muslim states, but in the policies of the U.S. and its allies. Seeing the world as their battlefield, the authors call for Muslim fighters to carry the battle abroad.
On this point, Muslims might raise a question of prudence, among other things. What will be the consequences of fighting on such a scope? Will it bring about more harm than good to ordinary Muslims? This question of impact is one that established Shari'a authorities have asked of every resistance or radical movement over the last 20 years. Bin Laden and others have alleged that coalition bombing resulted in the deaths of Muslim civilians. But who is responsible for these deaths? Do not those who issue imprudent calls for fighting Americans anywhere and everywhere bear some, perhaps even primary, responsibility?
Finally, with respect to legitimate targets, the declaration says that Muslims should fight against civilians as well as soldiers. But just as clearly, the precedents in the tradition of Shari'a reasoning reflect the teaching of the Prophet: "Struggle in the path of God. Do not cheat or commit treachery. Do not mutilate or kill women, children, or old men." In the tradition, this and other texts become the basis for a general rule: Never directly and intentionally target noncombatants.
It would seem, therefore, that the authors of the declaration are calling for an egregious violation of Shari'a tradition. So far as I know, crisis situations facing Muslims have never been considered sufficient reason to override the provision against direct targeting of noncombatants. The logic of the provision is that direct and intentional targeting of noncombatants constitutes murder. Those who commit murder, even in the context of war, are classified in Shari'a reasoning as war criminals. The canons of Shari'a reasoning are public. To commit oneself to speaking in Shari'a terms is to commit oneself to certain rules of the game. At various points, the authors of the declaration violate or stretch those rules. They can and should be called to account for this.
Christians, Jews, Muslims and all other people have an interest in engaging traditions of reasoning that speak of the obligation to seek justice--including, perhaps even especially, justice in the conduct of armed struggle. What is the connection between Islam and the events of September 11? The only connection that ever exists between a religious tradition and the actions of believers is the one those believers create, as they seek to justify their actions. In turn, it is the responsibility of others to answer back, and to show that these connections are well or ill founded, sound or weak--or as in the case of Osama bin Laden and his colleagues, the result of a combination of impudence and a lack of grounding in the tradition.
The Arabian Peninsula has never--since Allah made it flat, created its desert, and encircled it with seas--been stormed by any forces like the crusader armies spreading in it like locusts, eating its riches and wiping out its plantations. All this is happening at a time in which nations are attacking Muslims like people fighting over a plate of food. In the light of the grave situation and the lack of support, we and you are obliged to discuss current events, and we should all agree on how to settle the matter. No one argues today about three facts that are known to everyone; we will list them, in order to remind everyone: First, for over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples.
If some people have in the past argued about the fact of the occupation, all the people of the Peninsula have now acknowledged it. The best proof of this is the Americans' continuing aggression against the Iraqi people using the Peninsula as a staging post, even though all its rulers are against their territories being used to that end, but they are helpless. Second, despite the great devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people by the crusader-Zionist alliance, and despite the huge number of those killed, which has exceeded 1 million--despite all this, the Americans are once against trying to repeat the horrific massacres, as though they are not content with the protracted blockade imposed after the ferocious war or the fragmentation and devastation. So here they come to annihilate what is left of this people and to humiliate their Muslim neighbors. Third, if the Americans' aims behind these wars are religious and economic, the aim is also to serve the Jews' petty state and divert attention from its occupation of Jerusalem and murder of Muslims there. The best proof of this is their eagerness to destroy Iraq, the strongest neighboring Arab state, and their endeavor to fragment all the states of the region such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Sudan into paper statelets and through their disunion and weakness to guarantee Israel's survival and the continuation of the brutal crusade occupation of the Peninsula.
All these crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a clear declaration of war on Allah, his messenger, and Muslims. And ulema have throughout Islamic history unanimously agreed that the jihad is an individual duty if the enemy destroys the Muslim countries. This was revealed by Imam Bin-Qadamah in "Al- Mughni," Imam al-Kisa'i in "Al-Bada'i," al-Qurtubi in his interpretation, and the shaykh of al-Islam in his books, where he said: "As for the fighting to repulse [an enemy], it is aimed at defending sanctity and religion, and it is a duty as agreed [by the ulema]. Nothing is more sacred than belief except repulsing an enemy who is attacking religion and life."
On that basis, and in compliance with Allah's order, we issue the following fatwa to all Muslims: The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies--civilians and military--is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty Allah, "and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together," and "fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah." This is in addition to the words of Almighty Allah: "And why should ye not fight in the cause of Allah and of those who, being weak, are ill-treated (and oppressed)?--women and children, whose cry is: `Our Lord, rescue us from this town, whose people are oppressors; and raise for us from thee one who will help!'"
We--with Allah's help--call on every Muslim who believes in Allah and wishes to be rewarded to comply with Allah's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it. We also call on Muslim ulema, leaders, youths and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan's U.S. troops and the devil's supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson. ... Allah says: "O ye who believe, what is the matter with you, that when ye are asked to go forth in the cause of Allah, ye cling so heavily to the earth! Do ye prefer the life of this world to the hereafter? But little is the comfort of this life, as compared with the hereafter. Unless ye go forth, He will punish you with a grievous penalty, and put others in your place; but Him ye would not harm in the least. For Allah hath power over all things."
Almighty Allah also says: "So lose no heart, nor fall into despair. For ye must gain mastery if ye are true in faith." Issued by Shaykh Osama Bin-Muhammad Bin-Laden; Ayman al-Zawahiri, emir of the Jihad Group in Egypt; Abu-Yasir Rifa'i Ahmad Taha, Egyptian Islamic Group; Shaykh Mir Hamzah, secretary of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, Pakistan; and Fazlur Rahman, emir of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh. The varieties of Islamic activist groups and experiences are a testimony to the flexibility of Islam, and political Islam in particular. They illustrate the extent to which specific contexts, differences of political economy, Islam's capability of multiple and varied interpretations, and the distinctive personalities and ambitions of its leaders or ideologues shape the ideology and strategy of Islamic movements. This diversity underscores the problem of terminology, the extent to which facile labels can become an obstacle to understanding. How does one encompass in one term (revivalism, fundamentalism, militant Islam) the meanings and usages of Islam by rulers ( Qaddafi, Khomeini, Zia ul-Haq, Nimeiri) and Islamic organizations, their differing attitudes toward and relationships with the West, as well as the diversity of strategies and goals employed by mainstream activists versus violent radical revolutionaries? Islamic politics must be viewed within specific country contexts: far from being a monolithic reality, it manifests a rich diversity of leaders and forms. A second obstacle in assessing the future impact of Islamic movements--including the extent to which they will be a challenge or a threat--is their lack of a well-developed political agenda. Theoretical or ideological statements are often not accompanied by specific models for change. Islamic movements tend to be more specific about what they are against than what they are for. While all may speak of an Islamic order or state, of implementation of the Sharia, of a society grounded more firmly on Islamic values, the details are often vague. This has been true for older movements such as Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood as well as for more recent groups. After the electoral victory of Algeria's FIS (Islamic Salvation Front), when Abbasi Madani was questioned about his program, he described it as broad. When pressed for its practical steps, he replied, "Our practical program is also broad." Similar experiences are true for other Islamic movements.
Though many speak of Islamic government, they differ in their understanding of its nature, speaking about a variety of forms--a caliphate, consultative government and a strong executive, or a multiparty system--but do not go beyond this. Most activist leaders admit that, should they gain power, they would lack personnel, paradigms or models (political, economic, legal), and experience. Realizing their current unpreparedness to govern, some are more comfortable in the opposition or in parliament. Their critics--Muslim governments and Western policymakers--often seize upon this failure to be specific. Ironically, many critics argue that the extent to which movements represent only a minority of the population and have no real program dooms them to failure. Yet none seems willing to provide them with the opportunity to discredit themselves. Instead, despite fits of democratic rhetoric, political liberalization and democratization have been placed on hold or subverted, while Western governments are generally content to look the other way.
At the micro level, Islamic organizations have been successful in responding concretely to people's problems. Their Islamic ideologies offer a framework for meaning and purpose that responds to issues of identity, faith, and authenticity. As social movements they respond to the needs of many by providing educational and social welfare services. Islamic movements may at times be antiforeign, but seldom antimodern. Social gains have been accompanied by successes in the political arena as well. The Islamic movement has bridged the mythical divide between religion and secular modernization in the cities and towns of the more advanced countries of the Muslim world: Iran, Egypt, Lebanon, and Tunisia.
Islamic organizations often enjoy an impact disproportionate able to match. They are well organized, disciplined, and highly motivated. While some advocate violence and engage in terrorism, many today, if given the opportunity, participate within the political system. Many exemplify a high degree of integrity and self-sacrifice, have a clear sense of purpose and commitment, foster a sense of certitude and God-ordained mission. Activist organizations prove especially attractive because they offer an indigenously based and religiously legitimated alternative. They exude a strong sense of self-confidence and identity to those who are dissatisfied and disillusioned, who experience their governments and society as inadequate, corrupt, and incapable of responding to their people's political and socioeconomic needs. Islamic organizations and parties have proven especially successful where failed economics, unemployed and disaffected youth, and repressive governments make them effective critics of regimes. Their voices for political liberalization and social change often represent the only credible alternative to the government. The electoral record of Islamic organizations and their emergence as the major opposition in Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, and Jordan illustrate this reality.
Despite stereotypes of activists as fanatics who wish to retreat to the past, the vast majority share a common call for the transformation of society not through a blind return to seventh-century Medina but a response to the present. They do not seek to reproduce the past but to reconstruct society through a process of Islamic reform in which the principles of Islam are applied to contemporary needs. Each speaks of a comprehensive reformation or revolution, the creation of an Islamic order and state, since they regard Islam as comprehensive in scope, a faith-informed way of life. The modern nation-state is seen as in collapse; modern society is often described as in disorder (fitna). Why? Both the West and the traditional religious establishment (coopted preachers of a static Islam) are denounced as the culprits. They especially blame Western models of development and Westernized ruling elites--what Rashid Ghannoushi has called the "dictatorship of the ruling elite minority." A tyranny of the few over the many has led to political and economic dependence on the West and loss of cultural identity. All activist movements advocate a process of resocialization or re-Islamization of the individual (greater religious education and awareness) and mobilization of the community's political, economic, and administrative systems. The process is one of dawa and jihad, the call to be more self-consciously Islamic and the struggle to implement Islam in personal life and in state and society.
Abduh and Iqbal, they believe national reform is not contrary to, but a necessary step in and part of, the reconstitution of Islamic universalism. All advocate independence from the West and the East politically, economically, and culturally. However, they vary in their posture toward the West. Some, such as Hizbullah and many of the followers of the Ayatollah Khomeini, have totally rejected the West. Others like Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, AMAL, and the Renaissance Party do not preclude relations with or selective borrowing from the West. Most movements have increasingly taken great care to identify themselves with the disinherited or oppressed (mustadhafin) and emphasize issues of social justice. The socioeconomic situations in their own countries as well as the Iranian example have been formative influences. The plight of the poor, the condemnation of corruption, disparities of class and wealth, and the failure of the economy in general, whether it be capitalism or state socialism, are important to their populist messages.
In recent years most Islamic movements have moved toward a populist, participatory, pluralistic political stance, championing democratization, human rights, and economic reform. While many were critical of "democracy" in the past, they claim that this was a response to the secularism of the modern state as well as the autocratic nature of Muslim regimes. To varying degrees in recent years, most Islamic movements have emphasized change not through violence (which many now view as counterproductive) but through the political and social transformation of society. They speak of the need to prepare people for an Islamic order rather than to impose it. They seek recognition of political rights and participation in the electoral process. Yet there are differences within. Abdessalem Yassine and Algeria's Abbasi Madani have been slower than Ghannoushi to recognize multiparty politics and the democratic process. Moreover, the history of Islamic movements in Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia has shown that, where regimes deny political participation or suppress movements, state violence often begets violence. As the recent examples of the Renaissance Party and FIS demonstrate, there are diverse tendencies within Islamic movements, state repression and violence--suppression of demonstrations, denial of free and fair elections, arrests, imprisonment, torture--exacerbate differences, threaten to divide organizations, and often result in violent responses in what is regarded as legitimate self-defense against state oppression.
Just as the political economies and national experiences (from policies of cooptation and accommodation to violence and repression) of Muslim countries vary, determining the differing relations between governments and Islamic organizations, so too differences in ideological orientation and strategy exist within Islamic movements. All major Islamic leaders or ide-ologues and movements have emphasized and been influenced by belief in the need to construct their own solutions to their specific contexts and local problems. There are many such organizations; equally important, within each movement--the Renaissance Party and FIS, for example-there are different currents of thought. Madani's comment, "There is diversity in FIS but it is united," has been echoed by Ghannoushi. This diversity extends to attitudes toward modernization, militancy, the West, democratization and pluralism, the role of women, and most recently, the Gulf War and the use of force in domestic politics. Just as MTI experienced the defection of the Progressivists in the past, so too Ghannoushi and many other party members differed regarding support for Iraq during the Gulf War. Ghannoushi and some other Renaissance Party leaders, in particular Abdelfattah Mourou, split over tactics (in particular the use of violence) in responding to government repressions. In Algeria's FIS, Madani and Ali Benhadj differed sharply in their public statements about democracy. Moreover, Madani's statement--"There is no other way at present . . . the way to power is elections which are decided through the popular will of the people" --does not answer those who wonder whether the espousal of democracy by Islamic movements is a pragmatic, tactical accommodation or a principled position. Of course the same could be said as well for many incumbent Muslim governments and secular elites that advocate political liberalization and democracy.
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